More Super Hornets for Australia?

Detailed analysis is showing just what a capable aircraft RAAF has acquired with the Super Hornet. A strong case exists for increasing the size of the order, as Abraham Gubler reports.

No area of defence procurement has garnered more public commentary and controversy in the last two years than the plan to provide a new air combat capability (NACC) for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Infuriating the critics was the apparently unheralded announcement in late 2006 by the former Howard Government of the need to acquire 24 Boeing F/A-18F Block II Super Hornets as a bridge or “gap filler” to the eventual long term NACC solution the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

This decision has sparked an intense period of public denigration of the Super Hornet, Boeing and the JSF. This anti-Super Hornet/ JSF campaign has created the perception that they are inferior to any threat; especially the Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30MK (or FLANKER as NATO calls it). The FLANKER family are in limited service with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam within South East Asia and form the backbone of the Indian and Chinese air forces and would represent the most likely and lethal threat aircraft for the RAAF.

Subsequently one of the new Rudd Government’s defence related election commitments was to launch a Review of Air Combat Capability (RACC) sparked by these apparent concerns. This review was defined by the new Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon as putting all previous decisions on the table with everything up for reconsideration. In particular the review would explore the validity of acquiring the Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor, the critics favourite, and produce an outlook on regional air combat to 2045.

Led by senior Department of Defence official Neil Orme the review was rapidly concluded but its results remain restricted as they feed the development of the 2008 Defence White Paper. Like many change of Government initiatives the Orme Review was launched to find a ‘smoking gun’ displaying the previous Government’s incompetence in managing the NACC acquisition. Clearly Orme did not find any evidence of the kind of capability based criticism directed towards the Super Hornet and JSF.

The NACC challenge is more complex than simple political messaging though there were clearly significant errors made by the previous Government in following a risky acquisition path. To understand what lies ahead for the RAAF’s air combat capability and what will emerge in the White Paper from the RACC we need to look closely at the history of NACC and the importance of fleet management.

GETTING INTO THE NACC

On 10 November 2006 the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) meet to make their ‘first pass’ decision for Air 6000 Phase 2A/2B, to provide the bulk of the NACC solution. First pass decisions are designed to give the Government the opportunity to examine the capability’s need, options and risk separately of a later ‘second pass’ decision when more attention is given to detailed business cases with selection of a preferred tender. This process was adopted by the Government based on a recommendation by Malcom Kinnaird’s Defence Procurement Review (DPR) of 2003 after systematic problems in capability acquisitions through the 1990s like the Collins-class submarine’s original Rockwell combat management system (CMS).

Air 6000 had been underway since 1999 when industry was asked to respond to a request for information (RFI) to provide a NACC solution. The RFI was for tender quality information about potential air combat solutions and procurement packages. In 2002 towards the end of the RFI evaluation period the Howard Government decided not to proceed, and instead signed up as a minor partner to the USA led international Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project to develop and produce the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.

The JSF was selected to be the long term NACC solution but the indicative timings of its entry into service required the Government to launch the Air 5376 Hornet Upgrade Program (HUG) to ensure the lethality and airworthiness of the 72 McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A/B Hornets until they could be withdrawn during 2012-15 and replaced by F-35As. The reminder of the air combat force, the 27 General Dynamics F-111C/G strike aircraft, would be withdrawn from 2010 to allow part of their workforce to introduce the new F-35A into RAAF service.

Since the 2002 NACC decision Australia has been a 1% stakeholder, or Tier III, partner in System Design and Development (SDD) phase of the JSF project but without a contracted commitment to actually purchasing any aircraft. The question before the 2006 NSCC first pass was what were the needs, options and risks of going ahead with the JSF project. This meeting re-committed Australia to the JSF project by deciding to sign up for the next Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) stage and gave first pass approval to Air 6000 Phases 2A/2B purchase of 75 F-35As, with an option for another 25 under Phase 2C.

The bad news was the Government was also forced to accept the realities of a new delivery schedule for the F-35A. The United States Government (USG) had decided earlier in 2006 to delay the lion’s share of the development funding of the JSF to pay for the war in Iraq. This meant the RAAF would have to keep the Hornet in service until 2015-18; a delay of three years from the original timetable promised in 2002.

The Howard Government’s fighter replacement plans had always lacked leeway for risk and relied heavily on the original JSF timetable. This is why up until the end of 2006 defence leaders officially said there was no need for a “gap filler” or bridging fighter like the Super Hornet. With 2015-18 as the new best case timetable for withdrawal of the Hornet fleet the situation had changed dramatically with little lead time to ensure the continuity of the RAAF’s fighter force.

HORNET’S AIRWORTHINESS DEADLINE

The Hornet was originally manufactured by McDonnell Aircraft Corporation (now part of Boeing) to a US Navy specification with a structural fatigue safe life of 6,000 hours of flying. These 6,000 hours was based on the kind of usage they would receive in US Navy operations from aircraft carriers. Obviously the carrier takeoff and landing Hornets would operate under very different fatigue causing stresses to the more sedate life of a land based Hornet.

When the RAAF introduced the Hornets into service in 1985 they did so under an interim structural safe life pending an assessment of the aircraft’s operational environment. RAAF and Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) testing identified significant differences in usage type and severity between RAAF and US Navy Hornet operations. Consequently in the mid 1990s Australia and Canada (also a land based Hornet operator) commenced an International Follow On Structural Test (IFOST) program. The IFOST results, based on centre fuselage, aft fuselage and wing structural fatigue tests and evaluations, confirmed that RAAF Hornets would require major mid-life structural refurbishment and modifications to maintain safe operations if kept in service after 2008..

The Fatigue Life Expended Index (FLEI) is the measure of the consumed proportion of the certified structural safe life. A FLEI of 1.0 normally indicates that an aircraft has accumulated fatigue at the outer limit of its safe life range. The safe life range is where modelling, fatigue testing and associated analysis have deemed the aircraft to be airworthy. FLEI consumption greater than 1.0 may require an aircraft to transition to a ‘Safety By Inspection’ program or be withdrawn from service.

For accessible aircraft structures, an inspection program can be implemented to maintain the required level of safety. Structure that is either inaccessible or unable to be inspected requires modification or replacement. At FLEI consumption of 0.6 HUG 3.1 structural life modifications are necessary, beyond 0.72 requires HUG 3.2 Delta modifications or Centre Barrel Replacement (CBR) and 0.78 requires CBR. As of June 2006 the F/A-18A/B Hornet fleet’s average FLEI was 0.536. The spread of this average was relatively tight with 13 Hornets at or above FLEI of 0.6 and only 14 below 0.5, the balance of 44 were between 0.5 and 0.6. Each year with the flying rate to sustain 48 aircraft in three squadrons and an Operational Conversion Unit (OCU) each of the Hornets on average consumes 2-3% of its fatigue life (FLEI 0.02 to 0.03).

In effect the Hornets as originally purchase had an effective airworthiness as a fleet until 2008. This date also roughly complied with their effectiveness as a cutting edge combat platform and was the original 1999 set date for replacement of the legacy air combat fleet with the NACC. The selection of the JSF for NACC required the Hornets to remain in service beyond this deadline. Air 5376 Phase 1 saw the Hornets mission computers and communications systems upgraded and Phase 2 saw a new fire control radar, Link 16 secure data link, new cockpit displays, the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System (JHMCS), Electronic Warfare Self Protection (EWSP), countermeasures and a new Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) capability. These upgrades have transformed the RAAF Hornet into the most capable in the world but at the cost of significantly reduced availability through this decade.

CBR DILEMMA

The RAAF had already planned to replace the centre barrels in enough Hornets under Air 5376 Phase 3 to keep the fleet viable until the F-35A entered full operational service. With the three year delay in withdrawal from service would now mean that 65 Hornets, almost all of them, would need new centre barrels, up from the 49 planned and funded. To replace the centre barrel the aircraft is in the factory for at best 13 months as it is basically pulled apart and reassembled.

The Hornet Industry Coalition at RAAF Base Williamtown is yet to actually establish a full CBR capability. Until then some 10 low rate initial production (LRIP) CBRs will be conducted in Canada by L-3 Communications, adding to the out of service period because of delays in international transportation . Though the demand for Hornets is so high this is being mitigated by highly expensive charting of Antonov An-124’s to transport a single Hornet back to Australia.

With a roughly even fatigue level amongst the Hornets and a significant 1-2 year offline period for each CBR the fleet will struggle to maintain numbers through an extensive 49 to 65 airframe CBR program. By around 2010 the RAAF will have its LRIP CBR aircraft airworthy and a handful of low fatigue Hornets but the balance of the fleet, some 50 units, will be in the 0.7s area of the FLEI. If these aircraft go offline for CBR the RAAF will struggle to maintain 30-40 Hornets in service, far below the minimum needed for the fleet.

Recently Defence announced that DSTO investigation of the centre barrels removed from the prototype and LRIP to date Hornets indicates they are not as fatigued as previously thought. According to the DSTO lead study there is another 0.1 FLEI or two years life in the Hornet’s centre barrel than thought. The Defence Ministerial leadership has suggested this would enable the abandonment of the full rate production CBR. This decision has been made possible by the lifting of the pressure on the Hornet to provide the mainstay of air combat capability by the acquisition of a bridging capability.

F-111’S AIR COMBAT OBSOLESCENCE

The shortfall in Hornets is made worse by the obsolescence of the F-111, an aircraft that is not combat survivable against any medium level threat without escort by an air-to-air (ATA) capable fighter. At that time of its conception in 1962 the F-111 was to achieve combat survivability against enemy fighters by flying so low their radars couldn’t detect them against surface clutter like trees, hills and waves. Against anti-aircraft guns the F-111 would drop bombs on its first pass over the target, too quick for the manually operated Ground Based Air Defences (GBAD) to strike back, thanks to its then revolutionary computerised navigation-attack system.

Unfortunately neither survival technique is viable against contemporary high level threats but as was typical of the time, in comparison to now, such casualties would be accepted. The terrain following radar produced such a high powered and distinctive electronic signature that its operation warned the enemy an F-111 was approaching. By the 1980s the F-111 wasn’t even viable for Australia within the South East Asia region. The development and proliferation of ‘pulse-doppler’ fighter radars enabled threat fighters to detect low flying aircraft like the F-111 and intercept them. While the F-111s speed and endurance at low altitude enables it to escape some intercept threats this was dependent on early awareness of the threat.

GBAD systems were also integrated with their own sensors and computer to provide quick reaction, fast enough to hit the F-111 on a first pass bombing run. Even without modern integrated anti-aircraft systems some enemies like Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War just used massed barrages of anti-aircraft guns to put huge quantities of ‘lead’ into the sky. Low flying strike aircraft, like the British Tornado with a similar attack profile to the F-111, were subsequently shot down in unsustainable numbers.

The RAAF has known for a long time that the F-111 was no longer combat survivable so has changed the way they are used and has launched upgrades to try to keep them viable. To survive against air threats they are now escorted by Hornets and to survive against ground threats the F-111 flies high, above 10,000 feet (3km), and has been fitted with two RAFAEL AGM-142 ‘Raptor’ - a.k.a. ‘POPEYE’- stand off weapons (produced in the USA by Northrop Grumman) with a range of 55 NM (100km). Also a high level electronic counter measure (ECM) jammer has been fitted to provide enhanced protection against detection and tracking and to spoof enemy defences.

But these bandaid solutions are not ideal and the need for Hornet escorts places additional strains on a shorthanded RAAF. From around 2010 with only enough Hornets for two operational squadrons the RAAF will be limited to 24 sorties at any one time made up of 12 F-111s escorted by 12 Hornets and another 12 Hornets operating independently. Yet the RAAF is budgeted for and required by the Government to be able to put four squadrons or 48 combat aircraft sorties into the air.

Worse still than this cut in budgeted capability, the shortfall in fighter numbers would also mean the air combat workforce would not have enough weapon systems to develop and maintain their basic skills competency. Without air worthy aircraft pilots can’t learn to fly, ground based air combat officers (ACO) can’t practice three dimensional battlespace management, Navy ships can’t learn to defend against air threats and so on. This would have disastrous immediate and long term effects for Australia’s defence - leading to degraded professionalism and problems with retention that would take many years to rectify.

Security in Government 2009

The 21st federal attorney-general’s Security in Government conference was held in Canberra 16-19 September, attracting 410 delegates and 200 exhibitors. The conference reaffirmed the view that Australia still faces an uncertain strategic environment and the threat of terrorism - while receding – has by no means disappeared, as Kym Bergmann reports.

The deputy director of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is warning that concerns about Islamic terrorism should not be allowed to overshadow other security threats such as politically motivated violence and traditional espionage.

The deputy director, who declined to be identified other than as “David” says ASIO is anticipating an increase in what it terms “non-traditional” espionage threats with cyber-security a growing area of concern.

Speaking at the Security in Government conference on 16 September he said: “Australia continues to be a target for espionage and foreign interference - threats which can erode national institutions and values, degrade our ability to protect vital national interests, and undermine our crucial alliance relationships.”

Al-Qaeda remains a crucial challenge: “It has proven able to adapt, rebuild and reinvent itself.”

He said “while headway is being made against Islamic extremism, it will remain an enduring component of the global security environment for some time to come. Why do we think this is the case? One reason is that many of today’s terrorist leaders ‘cut their teeth’, so to speak, more than two decades ago in places like Afghanistan. That’s a generation, and counting.

“Another reason is that the propaganda and ideology espoused by Islamic extremists continues to garner a constituency, continues to appeal to, to attract, a new generation of followers.”

For Australia “the threat environment in South Asia continues to be volatile, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And recent bombings claimed by the Indian Mujahadin may indicate a worrying trend in India.

“Stability in South Asia is vital to the global security outlook. The prospect of further deterioration in the situation has significant and far-reaching security implications. Given that al-Qaeda’s core leadership presently operates from the tribal areas of Pakistan, ASIO remains focussed on al-Qaeda in Waziristan and the Tribal Areas, and any threats to Australia’s national security that may arise in connection with these areas.”

The deputy direction cautioned that “while...we expect Islamic extremism to be the key driver of anti-Western terrorism for some time to come, terrorism by other groups could also affect Australians, and Australians overseas. Given the range of potential catalysts for politically motivated violence, it would be imprudent to rule out the possibility that a new, previously unobserved terrorist threat could emerge in Australia, either as a by-product of events overseas, or as a result of a political grievance within Australia.”

Organisations engaged in terrorism “will continue to be innovators” he said, learning “from mistakes, and look for new ways to defeat counter-terrorism measures. This will be assisted by the increasing amount of information available in the public domain, and the ease with which information can be accessed via the internet and other news media.

“In terms of attack methodologies, terrorists will continue to favour bombings – vehicle bombs, suicide attacks and other improvised explosive devices incorporating homemade explosives. They will also continue to use firearms for frontal assaults, and conduct kidnappings and assassinations.

“However, the history of modern terrorism illustrates that terrorists not only take up new technologies as they emerge, but also develop new uses for old ones.

“The key, then, is not so much this or that technique or technology, as the capacity to surprise and defeat existing security measures.

“Careful consideration of how the internet might feature in this context, particularly whether it will work as a mechanism for cohering diffuse extremists or as a catalyst of fragmentation of the threat environment is needed.”

He said espionage is a real and ongoing threat, warning that “we are likely to see further diversification of the drivers, techniques and actors involved in this activity.

“Any hardening of existing or emerging geopolitical tensions, or sustained periods of militarisation, will likely increase the incentives of state agencies to engage in espionage. Another potential driver for espionage and espionage-like activity will be the competitive pressures created by ongoing globalisation. But the nature of espionage is also seen as evolving: “The scope of espionage is likely to embrace, but go well beyond, traditional targets such as highly sensitive government information and defence capabilities.

“Key global issues like energy and resources security will also drive future collection efforts. Some of the activity we see in this space certainly amounts to foreign interference, and the more harmful activity can constitute espionage sufficiently serious to warrant ASIO’s attention.

“Espionage techniques will also continue to evolve. The reliance of modern systems of government and business on interconnected electronic information systems involves risks of remote penetration. Cyber-espionage, which is a cost-effective and reasonably low-risk means of intelligence collection, is already an area of concern.”

Adelaide show could re-emerge

Organisers of the Asia Pacific Defence and Security (APDS 2008) exhibition are investigating options for its relaunch in a revised format after having been forced to call off this years’ event due to a looming blow out in security costs.

APDS Exhibitions Ltd announced 8 September that the 2008 exhibition, planned for Adelaide 11-13 November, was being suspended after concerns about potentially violent protests by a small cadre of activists.

APDS executive director Phil Guy says meetings with South Australian police and South Australian government officials in the first week of September saw concerns expressed about “serious issues of public order and security leading up to and during the event. Following that advice, and further discussions with the South Australian government, we had to make a difficult decision.

“Providing security against these radical and violent protestors has great financial implications.

“Naturally, we are very disappointed. Public safety and a secure environment for our exhibitors to carry out their business is paramount, therefore the event will not be proceeding in November as planned. However, there is clearly the potential to pursue the interest from these international companies and organisations in a different format.”

Guy says the planned event still remains “highly relevant to the Australian defence business marketplace, both in terms of meeting national priorities and in the development of a sustainable global supply chain role for local industry by providing linkages with potential international partners.

“The nature of the Australian defence business environment is that single service shows are inherently limited in their reach while any alternative model, such as opening the event to mass public attendance, has already been shown to blur the lines between catering for the needs of the enthusiast as opposed to the defence business professional. You only need to look at this years’ Farnborough air show in the United Kingdom to understand that the global aerospace and defence industries want far more from their trade shows than simply being an entertainment spectacle.”

Guy says “we will continue to emphasise our view of defence and security sector trade shows as part of a continuum in the marketing process. The exhibition is not the end goal in itself. At the domestic level an exhibition is part of a process of bridge building and linkage development between the Australian national industrial base, national policy for industry, state development requirements, employment strategy, defence policy for industry and defence capability development.

“You then look at that process in the context of international development. What occurs in the Australian domestic business environment is the basis for what opportunities can be leveraged in the global supply chain. At the moment the primary emphasis for that process is on the needs of a small number of major international defence and aerospace contractors, and while that is a good thing for Australia, our research for APDS clearly demonstrated that the same model can be replicated on a far wider scale in the lower tiers of defence industry. Global supply chain linkage development is something that is not exclusive to meeting the needs of the world’s top ten firms” he argues.

“There is clear differential in scale between Australian small to medium sized enterprises compared to their Asian, European and north American counterparts that can be leveraged through concerted approaches to provide global business opportunities. What constitutes a defence SME outside Australia is in inverse proportion to the comparative scales of business you find here in Australia. Those offshore SMEs are already attuned to doing business internationally; look at the realities of the European defence marketplace as currently stands. Australian industry can link with those firms to open up significant subcontract roles on far wider programmes, and fostering that process was a key element of the APDS event strategy. “Over the past 18 months APDS has conducted an extensive global marketing campaign and had received good support from many companies in the international defence and security markets who wished to promote their products to buyers in the Asia Pacific region, and who hoped to do so in Adelaide.

“We had been working since early 2008 to help our international exhibitors connect with local candidate companies so that the initial bridge building process was already far beyond the simple exchange of business cards at the show. We had likewise been building linkages in reverse for our Australian exhibitors. We complemented that by providing all of our exhibitors with guidance on emerging Australian capability needs. There was a complete process underway; fulfilling the needs and opportunities it had identified remains a priority for us.”

Guy says decisions on the way forward will be made over coming months with fresh talks underway with key partners and stakeholders. “In this current economic climate exhibition organisers need to provide more than just the platform to market their products. Our desire and vision is to provide more to both exhibitors and visitors by taking these steps further.

Annual report reveals tough year for NZDF

The New Zealand Herald’s front page headline of 3 September - “Can’t sail, can’t fly, can’t fight” emblazoned across photos of ships, planes and soldiers - would have had many in the New Zealand military well and truly stirred up.

Even more so, because it was directly based on the contents of the New Zealand Defence Force’s annual report. In the journalism business it had the hallmarks of what’s called a “beat-up”, but it at least contained the germ of Defence Chief LTGEN Jerry Mateparae’s statutory report to the nation’s parliament.

To quote Mateparae’s overview of the report: “there can be little doubt that the last year was a challenging one for us.”

The depths of the report, which line up all of government’s targets against what was actually achieved, provide plenty of evidence of just how challenging New Zealand’s 2007-2008 financial year ending 30 June actually was.

In short the NZDF is struggling. It is short of personnel in lots of key skill areas and having to maintain a high operational tempo with over 600 personnel on deployments to Afghanistan, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and other trouble spots.

It has also got a range of equipment and capability issues across all three services.

The report says “land combat force elements were partially prepared for low level conflicts only” and providing a battalion group response could not be achieved due to current operational commitments, equipment and personnel shortfalls.

Most combat support elements including artillery, engineers, communications, logistics, and medical units were under strength. The navy had trouble meetings its targets. The tanker HMNZS Endeavour spent only 50 days out of an expected 100-120 days at sea. While one frigate HMNZS Te Mana was deployed to the Middle East, its sister ship Te Kaha spent only 99 days out of an expected 140-160 days at sea and the new multi-role ship Canterbury spent only 95 days out of an expected 140-160 days at sea.

The navy was also unable to do any of the patrolling it was supposed to as delivery of its six new patrol craft under Project Protector has been delayed. Shortage of personnel and spares also meant it could only provide two of its five Kaman SH-2G(NZ) Seasprite helicopters for ship-borne operations. The air force shares the problem of staffing and while a lot of work is underway it is struggling to maintain operational outputs with aging and increasingly unreliable equipment.

The annual report says the RNZAF’s Lockheed Martin P3K Orion sensor upgrade programme is now running a year behind schedule, meaning the squadron is still operating with inadequate sensor and communication performance.

For much of the year both of its Boeing 757 transports were unavailable while they were being converted into dual use cargo or passenger carriers. The C-130 fleet also flew fewer hours than they should because of delays in the getting its first aircraft through major life-extension overhauls. The air force continued a maintenance battle to keep its old Bel Iroquois helicopters flying while it prepares to start taking delivery of its new NH Industries NH90 medium utility helicopters from 2010.

Published just two months out from the 8 November general election, the report has provided good ammunition for shadow defence minister Dr Wayne Mapp.

Mapp, who is promising to produce a new white paper on defence within a year of the elections, describes it as “an appalling state of affairs, not to mention internationally embarrassing.

“There is absolutely no doubt the Defence Force is under stress, partly due to the tempo of operations, partly due to challenges of recruiting and retention, and partly due to badly management procurement programmes. Defence Minister Phil Goff responded declaring the Defence Force is the best equipped it has ever been and making progress on recruiting and retaining staff.

He says the Government has invested more than $8 billion since 2002 in rebuilding the defence force.

“Obsolete and very old equipment is being replaced under a 10-year programme designed to give the defence force state-of-the-art helicopters, vehicles, ships and other equipment.

Goff also says personnel numbers are up 1000 on four years ago and are funded to increase overall numbers by around 12 percent. At present the NZDF has 13,889 personnel made up of 9278 regular forces, 2197 reservists and 2414 civilians.

However, Mateparae says recruitment and retention is one of the main challenges facing the NZDF. Regular force personnel numbers have risen since 2005 but the rate of growth has slowed and he is worried about shortfalls in critical trades. Attrition rates are also higher than expected, running at an average of 15.5 percent.