Tiger Lessons Burn Brightly
Newly released from the federal
government's watch list of defence
acquisition projects regarded as
being critically ill, the Australian
Army's Project Air 87 armed
reconnaissance helicopter project is emerging
as a key source for project management lessons
applicable to the wider reform of the Defence
Materiel Organisation (DMO).
The project remains some two years behind
schedule in acquisition terms, with the DMO
acknowledging it cannot make up that ground.
However, DMO also acknowledges that if
Australian Aerospace had not continued to fund
the project after the suspension of all Defence
Department payments in June 2007, the project
would be even further behind.
Army and the DMO are now focussed on the
transition of the aircraft into operational service
as a focal point for regaining some schedule. DMO
officials told 10 July hearings of the parliamentary
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade that the aircraft have now
achieved 2,700 flying hours in Australia, with 24
aircrew personnel trained.
DMO's head of helicopter systems MAJOR
Anthony Fraser told the parliamentary committee
that the Air 87 project had seen increasing failure
to reach schedule up until mid 2007 with the DMO
at that point electing to suspend all payments to
the prime contractor.
"The Tiger underachievement is attributed
to two factors. The first is the contractor not
making what was contracted, not achieving
what we expected to be contracted. The second
and major one specifically for Tiger was that
we suspended payment to Australian Aerospace,
the prime contractor, when it failed to achieve a
stop-payment milestone. It was in the contract
provisions and we took the quite significant step
of ceasing payments to it until it achieves the
required performance outcomes.
"Nearly for the whole financial year it was not
paid for work conducted on the aircraft and on
the project. It continues to provide services and
deliver equipment but it was not being paid
for that. That is an important issue, because
otherwise the project would continue to delay
even further still."
Australian Aerospace and the DMO signed a
letter of agreement to resolve disputed project
elements in May.
Fraser confirmed that while payments have
resumed, these are still on a restricted basis. "We
have negotiated a successful outcome to what
then became a dispute over those issues and
the through-life support, and we have resumed
partial payment to it at the moment, withholding
some of it until we actually sign the contract
change proposal."
The first three Tiger helicopters were handed
over to Army aviation's 161 reconnaissance
squadron in Darwin on 20 June to commence the
operational work up process.
SETTLEMENT DETAILS
Fraser told the parliamentary committee hearings,
examining Defence's annual reports, that the letter
of agreement "converted the through-life support
contract from essentially what was a cost-plus
type contract to a performance based contract,
driving an incentive on the contractor therefore
to reduce the total cost of ownership to the
Commonwealth. It has also focused on delivering
an operational capability to Army as quickly as
we can possibly do so. I am very pleased with the
new Australian Aerospace chief executive officer's
work and the focus of the company to provide us
that capability"
The June 2007 payment suspension was
primarily linked to the collapse of arrangements
for training Australian army instructors, with this
in turn connected to a two year delay in the
Franco-German Tiger acquisition programmes.
That had two effects on the Australian programme
Fraser said:
"The first was training the instructor staff, who
were going to be trained in France. The first four
instructors were to be trained on their aircraft.
Because the French army had not accepted their
aircraft and the French equivalent to DMO had
not accepted their aircraft, we were unable to
affect that training in the time frame that we
envisaged and [had] contracted.
"The second was that much of the data from
their aircraft was to be used for our simulator-
for example, to assist us with the certification and
the development of the simulator. The result of
that was a two-year schedule slip in the training
of our staff and training of the initial cadre of
flight crew...
"We managed as best as we possibly could to
recover training, but there are no other Tigers
in service in the world at this point in time.
We did send some personnel across to fly with
the US. We have looked at lead-in skills, and
part of the resulted negotiations here is to put
two [Eurocopter] EC135s into Darwin - glass
cockpit aircraft - to compress the training on the
aircraft type as much as we possibly can. We have
deployed some instructors across to France to
train with the French army to catch up as best we
possibly can.
"But realistically I do not see that we will recover
the two years. Our focus now is on developing
the operational capability as quickly as we can.
We cannot recover those first two years of basic
training. Perhaps we might be able to recover
some schedule in the operational transition and
development of the operational capability, which
is what our focus is on."
Training for instructors has been shifted from
France to Australia Fraser said. "What we ended
up doing was migrating it to Australia, and
the company at its own expense migrated its
senior instructor to Australia one-on-one for our
personnel. So that was the risk mitigation that
was implemented to be able to do that, and that
compressed some of the training."
The Air 87 project was running some 18 months
behind the Franco-German programme when
acquisition contracts were signed with Australian
Aerospace. Fraser told the parliamentary
committee that the DMO was aware "there was
certainly some risk associated with that" schedule
differential. However "my understanding is that
that was an informed risk and we were advised at
the time of a reasonable risk mitigator."
As well as support from Australian Aerospace,
Fraser said the programme had also been
heavily reliant on the French Director General of
Armaments in resolving schedule challenges: "I
would have to say the French equivalent to DMO
has been exceptional for us. We would be a lot
further behind had it not provided us the support
it has done. It has taken the engineering and
certification work for the aircraft and in isolation
has advanced us.
"There was a period of time when our aircraft
had caught up that full 18 months to the Franco-
German program as far as certification goes.
We had not completed the training but we had
certainly caught up in all the certification work.
It is a risk."
A key lesson says Fraser, is the need to accurately
assess technological and product readiness: "There
was risk in an early developmental program.
Perhaps part of many of the lessons learned...
is the full understanding of the maturity level
of the product and the off-the-shelf level of the
product that we are trying to gain for the defence
force, and to introduce into service; to make an
informed decision. It does not mean we should
not take some risk, because in some cases we do
need to take some risk with the developmental
program. It just needs to be understood that we
have that risk and therefore there is potential
delay to the operational capability."
FLOW ON EFFECTS
Fraser told the committee hearings that lessons
from the Tiger programme were flowing directly
into the Air 9000 phase 2 and phase 4 acquisitions
of Eurocopter MRH-90 helicopters. He said the
Australian MRH-90 programme "is the only one
in the world at the moment that is on schedule. It
is a tight schedule and difficult, but those lessons
have been applied...
"As much as anything it is about the shared
understanding and relationship management
between any contractor and any of the project
officers. Importantly for Eurocopter, the parent
company, and Australian Aerospace, they
understand the commonwealth's governance
requirements. The standards we set and our
expectations for documentation and governance
requirements are as rigid and robust as any in the
world.
"I do not think that they were as well understood
as they might have been in that shared relationship
when the first contract was signed for Tiger. Those
lessons have been migrated across to MRH-90
and understood. Therefore, for work that needs
to be done and appropriately resourced, the
contractor resources those areas that are needed
to make schedule."
Fraser said that a key difference between the
two acquisition programmes is that the MRH-90
is at a "more mature state than Tiger was for at
stage of the program. Fourteen countries have
signed up for MRH-90, with about 550 aircraft
on order, and there are more ahead of us that
have accepted the aircraft."
Army received its first two MRH-90s on 18
December last year, however Fraser said that the
flying rate "for this first half of the year is not up
to the level that we required. The mitigation that
we have effected as a result of that is to advance
the delivery of one of the aircraft from France by
six months."
That aircraft was transported to Australia in late
June using one of RAAF's Boeing C-17s. The first
Australian assembled MRH-90 is expected to be
handed over at the end of this year. All 46 aircraft
under the programme are planned to be delivered
by the end of 2014.
Intensive training on French MRH-90 aircraft
had run smoothly: "In fact, we overtrained; we
completed more training in France than what we
had expected to do as part of the risk mitigation.
The training will commence here in earnest very
shortly."
Nonetheless, Fraser said the MRH-90 training
programme is still regarded by the DMO as being
"medium risk, because we have only just started
the Australian version of the training program.
The contractor needs to prove the delivery of
equipment...
"Our program is the only one that is close to
schedule; it is on schedule. It is a very tight schedule
for us to achieve first operational capability for
Navy in 2010, which is a first flight at sea. For Army,
there is to be a troop of four deployable aircraft
in 2011. The schedule to achieve that as a full
operational capability is quite tight.
Artillery choice to
decide realisation
of HNA
The modernisation of the Australian Army's artillery system
through acquisition of a battle management system - fires
(BMS-F), new forward observer equipment and a mix of
lightweight, air portable and protected, self propelled 155mm
gun-howitzers has progressed significantly in recent months.
Despite second pass for Land 17 not being scheduled until mid 2009,
details are emerging about the kind of options cases that will be put to
the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) for decision. The
breadth of options is wide enough to have significant flow on effects to
the sustainment of the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) initiative
with the Land 17 centrepiece of a protected, self-propelled howitzer (SPH)
under threat.
Land 17 has a projected value of up to A$600 million, with this
comprising five grouped requirements making up the complete capability
objective. Package A is for the battle management system - fires (BMF-S)
and a forward observer system - the advanced field artillery tactical data
system (AFATDS). Raytheon Australia has been pre-selected to provide this
element of the project.
Package B is for the supply of self propelled 15mm systems with the
Land 17 tender asking for pricing on options of 18, 24 and 30. Package C
is for the lightweight air portable 15mm howitzer with the original tender
package seeking costing on a total of 35 guns. Package D is for the update
of the existing M198 155mm weapons. Package E is for replacement
ammunition.
The shortlist for Package B are the Kraus-Maffei Wegmann PzH2000,
being bid by BAE Systems Australia, and the Samsung Techwin AS-9, an
Australianised variant of the standard South Korean army K-9, which is
being bid by Raytheon Australia.
The M777 is the only contender for Package C with the Defence Materiel
Organisation (DMO) having now formally requested Letter of Offers from
the US Army for a foreign military sales (FMS) buy of up to 57 of the BAE
Land Systems M777A2 networked LWH. This number is in excess of the
original Land 17 request for proposals (RFP) requirement and Defence
has advised APDR that the additional gun numbers are to "ensure that
robust capability options are available" for NSCC. It says those options will
include various mixes of LWH and SPH.
Defence also says that the intention is to deploy the weapons tactically
using Australian Defence Force Boeing CH-47D helicopters. "This capability
is relevant and appropriate for the conduct of rapid strategic and tactical
deployment, especially in an amphibious environment or a high altitude
environment."
the basis of provisioning (BOP) plan for Land 17 called for the
modernisation of up to seven artillery batteries, each with six howitzers,
with new systems. Also under examination is the enhancement of the
Army's legacy M198 155mm gun-howitzers but this is not in addition to the
acquisition of the LWH and SPH: The M198 element of Land 17 has only
been progressed as cost comparison to the acquisition of new LWH and
would not proceed if the M777A2s are ordered
As well as seeking options for up to 35 LWHs, the Land 17 RFP and
request for tender (RFT) scope included options for 18, 24 and 30 SPHs,
these planned to equip either two, three or four batteries. The two battery
SPH plan would see 12 SPHs allocated to the 8th/12th Medium Regiment
in Darwin to replace their M198s and another six to training and logistics
units. The three and four battery plans would see the 1st Field Regiment in
Brisbane, replacing either one or both of its M198 batteries with SPHs, the
second being the recently reequipped reserve 41 Field Battery, which will
require an additional six or 12 SPHs.
Defence has not confirmed whether the additional M777A2s requested
were options for replacing acquisition of SPH but the total number
requested would provide for seven six LWH batteries with additional
systems for training and a maintenance pool.
Clearly there is potential under the current FMS request for Government
to decide to abandon the SPH acquisition and acquire an all M777A2
fleet. Such a move would be a disastrous blow to the HNA initiative that
recognises increased lethality and complexity on the battlefield, including
counter-insurgencies, require protection across all Army elements.
The need for HNA has been proved decisively in contemporary conflicts
like Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The alternative to acquiring protected
capabilities across the Army, like the SPH, is to accept higher levels
of casualties amongst our deployed forces as a natural flow on from a
reduced ability to directly protect from attack. SPHs have significantly
better mobility, lower manning, longer range, higher rates of fire and
high firepower density compared to LWHs whose principal advantage is
helicopter mobility and lower cost.
SPHs provide the ability to sustain offensive support fires that suppress
enemy action and significantly reduce casualties amongst friendly
manoeuvre forces in the face of the enemy counter-battery action.
This is a capability not available to the LWH. Even LWHs emplaced in
fortifications at a forward operating base (FOB) are vulnerable to casualties
amongst the gun crew. While this is not a new development in warfare it is
significantly exacerbated by the low force density in operational theatres
like Afghanistan. If one unprotected artillery battery is faced with counter
battery fire it cannot pass its vital suppressive fires to a nearby battery
because they are simply too far away.
While Australian artillery deployed to South Vietnam was exclusively
lightweight 105mm howitzers, the Australian Task Force (ATF) concerned
had an embedded capability of US Army M109 155mm SPH and additional
nearby long range guns to ensure offensive support.
RADIO ACTUALLY
The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) formally notified the
US Congress of the possible M777A2 LWHs sale to Australia on 17 July. The
transmittal notice says that the total value of the
proposed deal, which would include howitzers,
radios and other supporting equipment and
services is estimated by the agency at US$ 248
million.
The M777A2 and the M777A1 are fundamentally
different towed artillery system to all others
including the original M777 and the current Army
inventory of the M198 and Hamel 105mm guns.
In a first for towed artillery systems, the M777A1/
A2 incorporates a radio, digital fire control system
and electronic training and elevation controls. In
effect it is a complete stand-alone unit, whereas
legacy towed artillery systems require support
from artillery surveyors, signallers and fire
direction centres (FDC) to do anything other
than direct fire.
The key to achieving that high level of integration has been the addition of
cradle electronics assemblies above and below the M777A1/A2's ordnance
and recoil recuperators. The top cradle electronics assembly (TCEA) racks
a communications and location enclosure housing an ITT AN/VRC-91F
single channel ground and airborne radio systems (SINCGARS) radio
with its power supply and amplifier, and a defence advanced GPS receiver
(DAGR) with its antenna. Also on the TCEA is a separate box for an inertial
navigation unit (INU).
The under cradle electronics assembly (UCEA) holds the mission
computer, battery and the power conditioning and control module
(PCCM). Also mounted on the artillery system is a radio antenna, vehicle
motion sensor (VMS), and displays for the gun layers with these located
on the left and right of the breach. The first gun in charge of a detachment
also has a mobile display.
The M777A2 adds software improvements over the M777A1 allowing
the artillery system to send limited variable message format (VMF) back
into the battle management system - fires (BMS-F) updating its status.
Objective software improvements will add full send/receive VMF capability
able to update the gun detachments location and ammunition status,
integrated muzzle velocimeter to improve accuracy and the ability of the
gun to calculate all of its own fire missions. This would enable a M777A2
with the new software load to communicate directly with a forward
observer or (more likely) the BMS-F without the need of an intervening
FDC to provide fire mission calculations or manage its complete status.
This will give the M777A2 a BMS-F(FCS) [BMS-F Fire Control System] en
par with that planned for the SPH.
SELF PROPELLED
Making a quick judgement about the relative merits of the Kraus-Maffei
Wegmann PzH2000 and the Samsung Techwin AS-9 is necessarily
complicated by the two guns sharing many characteristics. The German
design has a slightly higher rate of fire, with a claimed three-round burst
in ten seconds, with the South Korean just slightly slower at 15 seconds.
The German gun has a magazine able to hold 60 rounds, whereas the AS-9
holds 44.
Both systems are capable of achieving multiple round simultaneous
impact - a technique of firing up to three rounds at different velocities on
different trajectories so that they all reach the target at exactly the same
moment. They both use 155mm 52 calibre guns, with purists expressing a
slight preference for the German product. The PzH2000 has a crew of five,
the AS-9 a crew of four.
Both vehicles use exactly the same diesel engine, producing around
1,000hp, but the K-9 is significantly lighter at 46 tonnes - the PzH2000 is
55 tonnes - and so claims to have a higher top
speed and better mobility thanks to a better
power-to-weight ratio. Raytheon/Samsung say
the weight reduction on the AS-9 is not a result
of reduced armour protection. On the contrary,
the AS-9 is fully compliant in this regard and can
even meet the very strict Australian anti-mine
requirements mandated by the Land 17 tender.
Raytheon's solution has been to add belly armour
developed by the Melbourne-based company
SEAL Solutions.
The AS-9 bid has one major differentiator
however: the bid includes an offer for a tracked
automatic replenishment vehicle which uses the
same chassis, drive train and engine as the selfpropelled
howitzer. Known as the K-10 (AS-10 for
Australia), it can carry 104 rounds, and offers the
same level of crew protection as the AS-9. This would allow a number of
AS-9s to be resupplied in the field even when under fire.
Both contenders have achieved significant sales, with the PzH2000 in
service with the armies of The Netherlands, Greece and Italy as well as
Germany. The K-9 is in service in South Korea and Turkey. However, the
K-9 production line is running and will continue for almost a decade based
on present orders - a massive 1,200 vehicles are on order for South Korea
alone. The KMW line is understood to have closed - not that its reactivation
would seem a major obstacle.
SPH EVALUATION
The SPH element of Land 17 provides the option for the tenderers as well
as DMO to offer, assess and recommend splitting the acquisition and
in-service support elements into two separate contracts. The provision of
in-service support from acquisition for the SPH will be a first for an ADF
land system.
The acquisition contract for the SPH includes the supply of 18 to
30 155mm SPH with their integrated BMS-F(FCS), and a quantity of
SPH qualified modular propelling charge systems (MCS)to insure the
introduction and acceptance into service of the system before long term
supply of MCS is established.
The Land 17 integrated project team (IPT) contracted in early 2008 for
technical advice on risk of available MCS for use in both the SPH and LWH.
That report is due by 26 August this year and the IPT will be holding tender
meetings through to September.
The MCS evaluation will cover a range of technical considerations
the plant required for manufacture and feasibility for current
future Australian manufacture. 4,800 US Army standard MCS units
been ordered by the Army under JP 2085 to support the introduction
the Raytheon/BAE Bofors XM982 Excalibur precision guided munitions
PGM).
The proposed SPH contract also covers integration of a remote control
station (RCWS) and radios aboard the vehicle, as well as supporting
spare parts and services for new acquisitions.
The in-service support contract includes all activities to sustain the
in service with the exception of operational sustainment like first line
operational and training area recovery and design approval
The contractor will be required to make available four fullmission
capable SPH, out of six located with each battery. Duration of the
contract is an initial five years with options exercisable out to 17
The importance of the two contract option is not to be underestimated.
the PzH2000 and K-9 are fundamentally similar artillery systems,
the extent of sharing the same engine. While there are differences in
capability, acquisition models, costs and industrial capability of the
neither SPH can boost a significant capability gap over the other.
difference will be found in the capabilities of the in-service support
where two very different companies are offering very different support
BAE Systems Australia is a company in transition from a primarily
house into a major vehicle integrator and builder through their
of preferred contactor status for the huge medium and heavy truck
of Land 121 and their acquisition of Tenix Defence. BAE Systems
in-service support offer for the SPH is based around building a new
artillery support centre in Adelaide, with this to be certified by KMW.
BAES Australia would also be able to leverage significant reach back
to the UK and USA where their new BAE Land Systems conglomeration
includes the original equipment manufacturer of the M777 and the
majority of the very significant British and American industry capability in
artillery vehicles and ordnance. With BAE's M777A2 a sure bet for the LWH
acquisition, the DMO could potentially create a single point of contact for
in-service support of all Army artillery systems.
Raytheon Australia's general manager for strategy Michael Ward says
his bid plan is focussed on de-risking the Samsung product to make it
acceptable to the Australian customer: "We see Land 17 very much as a
system integration task, though also with a requirement for top quality
hardware. At the heart of this is the C2 element: the advanced field artillery
tactical data system (AFATDS) being acquired directly from the US.
AFATDS is a Raytheon product and we have now completed a full system
integration test with the AS-9."
Ward point put that Raytheon is also familiar with advanced munitions,
such as the new EXCALIBUR system being acquired by Australia.
He notes that Australia already purchases conventional 155mm artillery
rounds from South Korea.
In country through life support for the AS-9 would be provided by
Thales Australia, in a subcontractor relationship to Raytheon. The team
argue that ongoing production for the K-9 for South Korea will continue
until at least 2018, making an Australian variant easier to support.
Samsung has also flagged plans to make the AS-9 the baseline for other
potential export sales of the. In turn that is expected to offers potential
export opportunities for Australian team members such as SEAL Solutions,
particularly as the South Korean domestic defence market opens up next
year under a government policy to diversify sources of supply.
Formal consideration of fourth AWD underway
Political and industrial speculation
about the acquisition of a fourth Hobart
class Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) has
been confirmed by the Department of
Defence with a formal request lodged
with the United States navy for the foreign military
sales (FMS) purchase of an additional Lockheed
Martin AEGIS combat system.
Defence says the FMS request will support
a firm pricing of a fourth AWD by the federal
government with final acquisition decisions to be
made as part of the 2008 Defence White Paper's
Force Structure Review (FSR).
The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) notified the US congress of the request on 11
July, with this pricing USN sourced components of a
fourth AEGIS combat system at US$ 700 million.
The major elements of the proposed would
include the core Mk 7 AEGIS weapon system
including the combat management system (CMS)
with its four AN/SPY-1D(V) phased array radars,
two Mk 99 target illuminators, 64 cell Mk 41
vertical launch system (VLS) and a cooperative
engagement capability (CEC) system.
Other equipment options flagged include the
Northrop Grumman Norden Systems AN/SPQ-9B
horizon search radar (HSR) and the Mk 20 electrooptical
sight (EOS), though these are likely to be in
competition with more advanced Australian and
international systems. Their inclusion in the letter
of offer is again part of the costing process for a
fourth AWD ahead of government consideration.
The AN/SPQ-9B has a rotating, back to back
antenna that scans the horizon once every second.
The higher cost and complexity of integrating
current non-US HSRs such as the Saab Systems Sea
Giraffe AMB and the CEA Technologies CEA-FAR
with AEGIS may appear to have scuppered those
two companies chance on the AWD.
Advocacy from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN),
the Navy League and industry, including strong
domestic political support in South Australia,
strongly backs a fourth AWD.
Force structure wise, the lobby argues that a
fourth ship will significantly increase the efficiency
of fleet management enabling three rather than
two ships to be available for operations, taking
into account periodic refits, modernisation and
training commitments. This results in a 50 percent
gain in capability for a 33 percent increase in
investment.
The actual cost of the fourth ship is likely to be
significantly lower than the average of the first
three thanks to efficiencies in production towards
the end of the line.
Capability benefits of a third at-sea-ship are also
likely to be far greater than the simple numbers as
multiple AWDs in one naval task force provide
significantly higher air and horizon coverage and
additional spare vertical launch system (VLS) cells
for other weapons like land attack and ballistic
missile defence (BMD) missiles. Further, without
a fourth AWD the RAN's surface warship numbers
would slip from 12 to 11 unless the costly decision
was made to keep small numbers of a third class
of warship, from the less than successful Sea 1390
FFG Upgrade (FUG), in service.
The fourth AWD is also seen as instrumental
in retaining the production capability of the
ASC Shipbuilding, and Raytheon Australia in its
capacity as combat systems - systems engineer,
through until the commencement of construction
on the first Project Sea 1000 future submarine.
The Sea 1000 boat is intended to replace the
current Collins class from the mid 2020s. Without
the fourth AWD the workforce established under
Sea 4000 would dissipate before the schedule of
work begins for Sea 1000. Though dovetailing Sea
4000 into Sea 1000 does not officially guarantee
either ASC or Raytheon Australia will retain their
respective corporate involvements, it does ensure
the common user facilities and industrially mobile
skilled workforce would be sustained.
The Australian Labor party committed itself
during the November 2007 federal election to
building the future submarine in Adelaide and
was rewarded by the electorate with strong voting
gains. Labor also has shown strong historical and
contemporary support for the domestic defence
shipbuilding workforce.
Observers note a fourth AWD is also likely
to be supported by senior federal government
staffers, including the prime minister's current
chief of staff David Epstein, and the defence
minister's media adviser Christian Taubenschlag,
both having been working on the AWD project
before taking up their current roles. While conflict
of interest is not a reasonable concern, having
informed friends in high places is extremely
important for any costly project or initiative in a
new and inexperienced Government.
